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ARTICLES

Airport Dominance and State Action
Antitrust Immunity for Airport Operators
Robert A. Sinclair*
I.

Introduction

One of the striking features of the deregulated airline industry
has been the adoption of hub-and-spoke delivery systems by the ma-

jor airlines. Hub-and-spoke refers to delivery systems that entice airlines to maintain a large presence at some 'hub' city so that a passenger bank can be established to feed connecting flights to 'spoke'
cities.1 This practice has led to a rather skewed usage of airport facilities. In many large and medium sized airport markets, one airline
dominates the airtraffic. Recently, this dominance has been a source
of concern.' The debate revolves around the question of whether the
* Robert A. Sinclair is a Doctoral candidate in the Department of Economics at the
University of Pittsburgh. He is presently working in the fields of Industrial Organization and
Law and Economics. M.A., University of Pittsburgh, 1989; B.A., Indiana University of Pennsylvania, 1986.
1. Large capacities are needed at hub airports so that flights that converge, somewhat
simultaneously, from spoke cities can be accommodated. For an idea of the level of airline
dominance consider Atlanta, where Delta Airlines enplanes 58% of the 21.8 million passengers there. United enplanes 50% of 26.6 million passengers at the Chicago O'Hare Airport.
Other examples include: Dallas/Ft. Worth (American Airlines), 63% of 21 million; Detroit
(Northwest), 60% of 9.2 million; Minneapolis (Northwestern), 77% of 8.2 million; Pittsburgh
(USAir), 86% of 8.4 million; St. Louis (TWA), 82% of 9.5 million. FAA, Airport Activity
Statistics of Certificate Route Air Carriers(1989).
2. See generally Airline Competition Enhancement Act: Hearingon S. 1741 Before the
Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 508 (1989); Severin Borenstein, Hubs and High Fares:Dominance and
Market Power in the U.S. Airline Industry, 20 RAND J. OF ECON. 173 (1989); Barry E.
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dominance at airports serves the purpose of reducing costs to travelers or whether it serves to create the opportunity to exploit monopoly power.
The antitrust laws are a tempting mechanism through which to
address airport dominance. However, whether the contracts that give
rise to airport dominance are likely to be viewed as anticompetitive
is a very complex issue. It involves a great deal of economic and
legal analysis and exceeds the scope of this Article.3 Instead, this
Hawk, Airline Deregulationafter Ten Years: The Need for Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement
and Intergovernmental Agreements, 34 ANTITRUST BULL. 267 (1989); Simat, Hellieson &
Eichner, Inc., An Analysis of Airline Hub and Spoke Systems Since Deregulation,for the Air
Transport Association (1989); Scott Kilman, An Unexpected Result of Airline Decontrol is
Return to Monopolies, WALL ST. J., July 20, 1987, at 1.
3. Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976 & Supp. 1991), apply
to antitrust issues regarding airport dominance. The primary distinction between the two sections of the Act is that § I addresses multilateral behavior whereas § 2 addresses unilateral
activity.
The first section is the most likely candidate to embroil an airport in an antitrust challenge. This section would probably apply in situations where contractual relationships appear
to give some incumbent (dominant) airline economic advantages over others in exchange for
airport renovation financing or long term commitments to provide air service. During the
nearly 40 years of airline regulation, airlines rarely shifted route structures. As a result, their
enterprise grew and developed along with the airports at which they operated. Even if an
allegedly favored airline does not manifest a quid pro quo in the form of airport financing,
these close historical relationships could prompt accusations from antitrust plaintiffs that airport operators have been simply co-opted by incumbent airlines.
Charges under § 1 are conducted under two alternative analyses, the Per Se approach and
the "Rule of Reason." Per Se violations are those "agreements whose nature and necessary
effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality." National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S.
679, 692 (1978). The most common types of agreements included in this category are: Price
fixing, see United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); Exclusive territories,
see Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); and Concerted refusals
to deal, see Fashion Originator's Guild of America v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457
(1941).
The alternative § 1 approach is the Rule of Reason which had its origin in Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). The Rule was eloquently articulated in Chicago Bd.
of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918):
[T]he legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple
a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade,
every regulation of trade restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence.
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition.
See also United States v. Socony-Vaccum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) and references
therein; United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); United States v. TransMissouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 312 (1897).
A § 2 charge against airport operators is more difficult to imagine because both exclusion
of competitors and some possession of monopoly power would have to be present. See generally
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416
(2d Cir. 1945); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964). It is somewhat implausible to think of airports excluding competitors such as other airports and exploiting monopoly power for their own benefit. There have been § 2 charges against airport operators, and the courts have either dismissed these for the above reason or because of the
existence of immunity. See, e.g., Interface Group, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 816
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Article considers the antitrust immunity which may be available to
airport operators in the event of an antitrust challenge. In particular,
the issue of state action immunity for airport operators is examined
in light of recent developments of the State Action Doctrine" and
recent case law regarding airport operators involved in antitrust
challenges. Part II of this Article examines the nature of state action
immunity, and Part III considers how state action immunity may
apply to airport operators in the context of the emergence of huband-spoke delivery systems.
II.

State Action Immunity: Origins and Development

In order to invalidate a state law because of its conflict with the
Sherman Act, it is not sufficient that the law in question generates
anticompetitive effects. 5 Unless activities by the states unduly burden
interstate commerce, for example "neutraliz[ing] economic advantages belonging to the place of origin," 6 or imposing "an artificial
rigidity on the economic pattern of the industry, ' 7 the states have
somewhat broad latitude in their actions that impinge on
competition.
The State Action Doctrine provides a framework within which
states and their agents can carry on activities immune from antitrust
liability. The doctrine was originally formulated in Parker v. Brown8
where the U.S. Supreme Court held that the activities of governmental bodies which tended to obstruct competition were "an act of government which the Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit."9
The Court in Parker,citing legislative intent, noted that nothing in
the history of the Sherman Act "suggests that its purpose was to
restrain . . . activities directed by [a state's] legislature.""0 The
F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987); Montauk-Caribbean Airways, Inc. v. Hope, 784 F.2d 91 (2d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 872 (1986); Rocky Mountain Airways, Inc. v. Pitkin County,
674 F. Supp. 312 (D. Colo. 1987).
4. See infra notes 6-31 and accompanying text.
5. There are a number of considerations that may protect an anticompetitive statute
from Sherman Act liability. See generally Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117
(1978) (outlining criteria for preemption of state laws by federal laws); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (First Amendment
can prohibit some state laws that restrict commerce.); Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137
(1970) (Commerce Clause prevents undue interference in interstate trade.). For a brief overview and additional references, see PHILLIP AREEDA & Louis KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
139-41 (4th ed. 1988).
6. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 528 (1935).
7. Toomer v. Witsel, 334 U.S. 385, 404 (1948).
8. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
9. Id. at 352 (citation omitted).
10. Id. at 350-51.
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Court's inclination for such strong protection was also based in its
adherence to the principles of federalism-the notion that "[i]n a
dual system of government in which, under the constitution, the
states are sovereign .

. .,

an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's

control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to
Congress."11
The Parker doctrine remained essentially intact until the mid
1970s when the Court initiated a reformulation of the doctrine. The
first changes marked a clear narrowing of the circumstances within
which states and their agents could engage in anticompetitive activities without creating antitrust liability.12 However, during the mid
and late 1980s, the Court changed direction and began to broaden
the immunities, especially those afforded local municipalities. 13 The
following discussion outlines this reformulation.
The first changes to the State Action Doctrine formulated in
Parker seem to have developed in response to the Court's desire to
curtail the immunity afforded to individuals when their actions as
state agents sufficiently diverged from intended state policy. For instance, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 4 the Court considered an
anti-competitive pricing arrangement established by the Fairfax
County Bar Association, acting under guidelines promulgated by
Virginia's Supreme Court.15 The Court held that the activities of the
local Bar Association, although "prompted" by state authority, were
not manifestations of the state's intention."' The Court considered
the criteria that would serve to justify local governmental and private activities as state action and ruled that the "anticompetitive activities [of state agents] . . . must be compelled by the direction of

the State acting as sovereign."' 7
Subsequent rulings have also considered the limitations of immunity to state agents.' 8 The case law that resulted in the reformu11. Id. at 351. For further discussion of federalism and the State Action Doctrine, see,
e.g., Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust and the New State Action Doctrine:A Return to Deferential
Economic Federalism, 75 CAL. L. REV. 227 (1987).
12. See infra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
13. It is interesting to speculate why the Court was suddenly prompted to reconsider the
immunity afforded private individuals acting as state agents. One theory is that the Court
became confident in its ability to take on complicated and involved economic analyses of antitrust issues. See Jorde, supra note 11, at 239 n.78.
14. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
15. Code of Professional Responsibility, 211 Va. 295 (1970).
16. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. at 791.
17. Id. at 791 (emphasis added).
18. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978) (hold-

ing that activity must be authorized by a state policy in order to displace antitrust laws);
Cantor v. Detroit Edison, 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (immunity denied since the anticompetitive
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lation of the Parker doctrine was based on the desire to ensure that
meaningful state participation coexisted with activities undertaken

by state agents. 19 This analysis led to the deterioration of the protections afforded municipalities and other agencies.20 In CaliforniaRetail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,21 the Court

articulated a two-pronged test that further restricted the types of anticompetitive activities which states could safely undertake. First, it
required the obstruction to competition to be "clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed as state policy." 2 2 Second, and most notably,
it required that "the policy must be actively supervised by the State
12

itself."
It is unclear what the Court's intention was. It seems that it was
attempting to place the activities of private state agents and perhaps
some state agencies under stricter antitrust scrutiny, while attempt-

ing to continue to protect activities of agents more closely associated
with governmental functions. This appears to be a valid theory be-

cause the Court continues to use the Midcal test in subsequent cases,
but restricts the application of the active supervision prong to provide more protection to municipalities.2

In Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire,25 the Court interpreted the first prong of the Midcal test to mean that clear legislative articulation and affirmative expression is sufficiently satisfied if a
legislative statute "clearly contemplate[s]" the anticompetitive activity in question or if the result is "logical" or "foreseeable. 26 More
importantly, the Court exempted municipalities from being held to
the active supervision requirement. 7 This modification illustrates the
activities were not necessary to regulatory scheme).
19. See generally Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471
U.S. 48 (1985); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985); Hoover v.Ronwin,
466 U.S. 558 (1984); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U.S. 97 (1980); Cantor v. Detroit Edison, 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
20. The reduced immunities resulted in some large damage settlements against municipalities. See, e.g., Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1984);
Lafayette, 435 U.S. 389. Largely in response to these massive settlements resulting from reduced immunity, Congress passed the Local Government Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 35 (Supp.
1991), which eliminated treble damages in cases against local government entities.
21. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
22. Id. at 105 (citing Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410).
23. Id.
24. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
25. 471 U.S. 34 (1985). See also Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984).
26. Hallie, 471 U.S. at 42.
27. Id. The Court did not exempt or ease the burden of the second prong for those
agents who are private individuals and did not address the question of whether state agencies
would be held to the active supervision prong. The rationale for the distinction between municipalities and private individuals and state agencies is that municipalities are more likely to act
in the public interest, are open to more public scrutiny, and are often subject to electoral
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Court's motive of easing the burden on municipalities while still
maintaining pressure on private individuals to conform to the intentions of state policy.
The principles articulated in Hallie seem to settle the basic issues that prompted the formulation of the State Action Doctrine.
The doctrine now has more rigorous standards for private actors
while municipalities and other state agencies need only show that
their activities were a foreseeable consequence or a logical result of
some state policy.28
City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising28 is the most
recent Supreme Court decision involving the Parker doctrine and
provides further protection to municipalities by holding that evidence
of conspiracy by a local municipality is not enough to generate Sherman Act liability as long as the result of the conspiracy is a foreseeable consequence of state policy.30 The opinion suggests that subjecting governmental bodies to antitrust liability would make all
anticompetitive regulation vulnerable to antitrust liability "[s]ince it
is both inevitable and desirable that public officials often agree to do
what one or another group of private citizens urges upon them."31
This case is another indication of the Court's reluctance to use
the Sherman Act to rectify anticompetitive consequences originating
from state initiatives. As discussed below, the Court's reluctance
likely will lead to stronger protections for local governmental bodies
and, in particular, airport operators.
III.

State Action Immunity and Airports

Airport operators are usually classified as municipal departments such as a County Department of Aviation, a City Department
of Aviation, or a Port Authority.82 For purposes of antitrust immunity, airport operators or the authority having the ultimate responsiprocesses. Private individuals and state agencies are often less visible, and the presumption of
acting in the public interest is more difficult to make. See id. at 434 n.9. There was an inference in Hallie, however, that state agencies would likely be exempt from the active supervision
requirement. See id. at 468 n.10.
28. Id.
29. 111 S. Ct. 1344 (1991).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1351.
32. The airports at which the major airlines have established their hubs are all owned
and operated by a municipality or a municipal authority. These include: Hartsfield International (Atlanta); Love Field (Dallas/Ft. Worth); Wayne County (Detroit); Minneapolis/St.
Paul; Greater Pittsburgh International; Lambert-St. Louis Municipal. To the author's knowledge, no other large or medium-sized city has an airport that is operated other than as a
municipal department or authority.
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bility for the actions of airport managers, can expect, for legal purposes, to be treated as municipalities. As a result, the active
supervision requirement of Hallie is inoperative, and the airport operator only needs to show that its activities are clearly articulated by
state policy, that the activities are a logical result of state policy, or
that the activity complained of was within the contemplation of the
legislature.83
Cases that have specifically considered the issue of airport operator behavior with respect to space and facility allocation provide
further insight. Recent decisions have varied, but courts generally
have been inclined to grant immunity to airports in cases where airport space has been denied to potential competitors. 4
Antitrust challenges would most likely be alleged under a § 1
theory of the Sherman Act.3 5 The airport operator would be charged
with complicity in restricting or suppressing competition at its airport through lease agreements. There is no case law on the specific
question of airport dominance from the hub-and-spoke networks.
However, there is case law addressing similar situations where an
airport denies space to certain airlines, and that denial appears to
promote the interests of the incumbent airline. Two examples are
New York Airlines, Inc. v. Dukes County 0 and Montauk-Caribbean
Airways, Inc. v. Hope."7 In New York Airlines, immunity was denied to a local airport, but in Montauk, the court held that the airport's activities were immune from antitrust liability. 8
The case of New York Airlines is an important exception to the
otherwise general rule that immunity is granted to airport operators.
Martha's Vineyard Airport Commission was denied immunity
against a Sherman Act § 1 charge alleged by New York Airlines,
Inc. (New York Air) after New York Air was prohibited from operating at its airport.3 0 The Commission had operated its airport with,
among others, Princetown-Boston Airways (PBA).40 New York Air
petitioned for permission to operate at the airport. 4 ' The facts indi33. See notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Interface Group, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 816 F.2d 9 (1st
Cir. 1987); Montauk-Caribbean Airways, Inc. v. Hope, 784 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 872 (1986); Rocky Mountain Airways, Inc. v. Pitkin County, 674 F. Supp.
312 (D. Colo. 1987).
35. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
36. 623 F. Supp. 1435 (D. Mass. 1985).
37. Montauk, 784 F.2d 91.
38. See id.; New York Airlines, 623 F. Supp. 1435.
39. New York Airlines, 623 F. Supp. at 1440.
40. Id.
41. New York Airlines, Inc. v. Duke County, 623 F. Supp. 1435, 1440 (D. Mass. 1985).
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cate that the Commission, satisfied with the service of the two main
airlines and concerned with the effect competition would have on
PBA, denied New York Air's petition.4

The court recognized the Commission's authority to enter into
leases and set policies for use of the airport.43 However, immunity
was denied since, as the court reasoned, the Massachsuetts Laws "do
not on their face demonstrate a clear intention on the part of the
state to displace competition ' with monopoly." "The fact that the
Commission may adopt rules and regulations to insure the safety of
the public is not sufficient evidence of authority to engage in anticompetitive conduct.

.

..

-45 Additionally, "there are no provisions

for state review, nor are there other indications that the state is actually supervising
the activities of the Commission pursuant to state
46
policy.

The Montauk court also addressed the denial of airport facilities to a plaintiff airline but reached a contrary result and granted
immunity. Montauk-Caribbean Airways filed an antitrust suit under
§ 1 of the Sherman Act against the Town of East Hampton, New
York and the main airline at the airport, East Hampton Aire.'
Montauk-Caribbean operated only part of the year and wished to
extend its lease to provide year round service.4 The airport denied
the request. 9 The court, noting 'that the airport's state charter empowered it to enter into exclusive lease arrangements, found that denying the year round lease was a "foreseeable consequence" 50 of the
delegated authority. Thus, the court granted immunity to the
airport. 51
The divergent results of these two cases illustrates an important
problem in recognizing parameters within which local airport opera42. New York Air alleged that at a meeting on April 25, 1985, a representative of PBA
stated that PBA would cease providing winter service if New York Air's proposed service was
approved. Id. at 1450.
43. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, §§ 51F-51J (West 1989).
44. New York Airlines, 623 F. Supp. at 1451.

45. Id.
46. New York Airlines, Inc. v. Duke County, 623 F. Supp. 1435, 1452 (D. Mass. 1985).

By this time, the Hallie Court had already nullified the active supervision requirement for
municipalities so it is not clear why the court mentioned this point. The court was obviously
aware of the Hallie decision because prior to arguing the lack of active superivsion, the court
cited to the Hallie case. See id.
47. Montauk-Caribbean Airways, Inc. v. Hope, 784 F.2d 91, 93 (3d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 872 (1986).
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 97.
Id. at 96.
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tors can safely conduct activities. The Massachusetts laws and the
New York laws delegate similar authority to airport operators.5 2
Both states, as do most states, allow local airports to enter into lease
arrangements with airlines.53 In both cases, the airline was denied an
opportunity to enhance its competitive position by the airport. However, in New York Airlines, the court judged the restraint to be
outside the parameters of the first prong of the Hallie test while the
Montauk court reached the opposite conclusion. Determinations of
whether an activity has been "articulately and affirmatively expressed" as state policy will inevitably require a degree of judgment.
Consider the situation for airport operators that have entered
into long term leasing arrangements with dominant airlines. If the
arrangements are found to be anticompetitive, Sherman Act liability
will hinge on whether statutory power to enter into long term leases
would logically result in large concentrations of particular airlines.
A pivotal concern for airport operators is whether state legislatures had envisioned the potential effects of airline deregulation
when they established mandates for managerial authority of local
airports. Before airline deregulation, legislatures could anticipate
that the impact on prices and service resulting from leases and other
airport policies would be controlled by federal regulations. It is questionable whether granting local governments authority to enter into
leases would create a situation where those governments would not
be able to maintain competitive conditions under a dynamic changing industry prompted by an unconceived deregulated environment.
Even most airline industry experts failed to predict the degree to
which hub-and-spoke systems would proliferate when the airlines
were deregulated. Thus, it is unlikely that state officials would have
or could have contemplated or foreseen the emergence of dominated
airports.
IV.

Conclusion

New York Airlines and Montauk, the cases that most closely
parallel the airport dominance situation, do not provide a clear basis
from which to predict the response by a court called upon to decide
an antitrust challenge to a dominated airport. This leaves the question of whether airports are likely to receive immunity unresolved.
If courts focus on the dominance that results from allowing air52. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 90, §§ 51E-52 (West 1989); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 352
(McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1985).
53. MAss. GEN. LAWS. ch. 90 § 51F-51J; N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 352.
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ports to enter into leases and conclude that these results were not
likely to have been considered by states when establishing authority
for airport operators, the immunity available to airport operators
may be questionable. On the other hand, if courts focus on the act of
denying and granting of leases, it is likely, if not obvious, that state
legislatures had expected such consequences.
In light of recent trends in the Supreme Court's reasoning, particularly the tendency to grant broader immunities to governmental
bodies, it seems likely that airport operators will be offered substantial latitude in their dealings with airlines. City of Columbia v. Omni
Outdoor Advertising suggests that even policies by airports
designed to give advantage to a favored airline would not be objectionable. 55 The restraint that the Court has exercised in applying the
antitrust laws to local governmental activities in recent times will
probably continue. Thus, it would be expected that airport operators
would be shielded from antitrust liability in their relationships with
airports.

54. 111 S. Ct. 1344 (1991).
55. It is interesting to speculate what the result of New York Airlines would be in light
of City of Columbia since it seems that the New York Airlines court relied partially on the
perception that the airport authority was protecting the incumbent airline, PBA, from competition. See supra note 42.

